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The rise of the UK Independence Party has been one of the most dramatic and widely discussed 
features of British politics in recent years. This article argues that one vital but largely overlooked 
facet of this phenomenon has been the politics of national identity. It argues that despite the UK 
IﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW P;ヴデ┞げゲ ﾗゲtensibly unionist stance, Englishness is an important pivot around which key 
WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ;ヮヮW;ﾉ ヴW┗ﾗﾉ┗Wが ﾐﾗデ;Hﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa ｷデゲ Euroscepticism, its opposition to 
immigration and its anti-establishment narrative. It argues that the Anglo-Britishness promulgated 
by the UK Independence Party allows space for the celebration of English identity rather more easily 
than of other sub-state national identities, as it does not challenge the legitimacy of the UK state, 
which is itself seen as the expression of Anglo-British identity and sovereignty. Scottish nationalism, 




As its very name suggests, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has always had the politics of national 
identity at its core. The party was not founded to represent a particular class or sectional interest, 
but to pursue one key aim に to bring about British withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Even 
as UKIP has sought to broaden its appeal and range of policies beyond that of a single-issue party 
this has remained its overriding objective, and the lens through which most of its other policy 
positions are framed and understood. The commitment to withdrawal from the EU is the first 
ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉW WﾐゲｴヴｷﾐWS ｷﾐ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐく Following this, in the same opening paragraph, the 
constitutional document goWゲ ﾗﾐ デﾗ ゲデ;デWぎ けThe Party further believes that the integrity of the United 
KｷﾐｪSﾗﾏ ﾗa GヴW;デ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐ ;ﾐS NﾗヴデｴWヴﾐ IヴWﾉ;ﾐS ふｴWヴWｷﾐ;aデWヴ さTｴW UﾐｷデWS KｷﾐｪSﾗﾏざぶ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW 
maintainedげ ふUKIPが ヲヰヱヲぶく  
 
Ostensibly at least UKIP is therefore a unionist party, making it a somewhat surprising channel for a 
political Englishness に ; ヮ┌┣┣ﾉW デｴｷゲ ;ヴデｷIﾉW W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWゲく UKIPげゲ unionism ヴWaﾉWIデゲ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ 
heritage as essentially a splinter on the Conservative right that emerged at the height of tensions 
within Conservative ranks over the issue of European integration in the early-1990s. The party was 
formed out of the Anti-Federalist League established by the academic Dr Alan Sked, who hoped it 
け┘ﾗ┌ﾉS Iﾗﾐ┗Wヴデ デｴW Tﾗヴ┞ P;ヴデ┞ デﾗ E┌ヴﾗゲIWヮデｷIｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS デﾗ Bヴｷデｷゲｴ IﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIWげ ふケ┌ﾗデWS ｷﾐ FﾗヴS ;ﾐS 
Goodwin, 2014, 21). Sked had also been involved in the Bruges Group, which similarly wanted to 
move the Conservative Party in the direction outlined by Margaret Thatcher in her 1988 Bruges 
speech. This anti-federalism is importanデ aﾗヴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ UKIPげs unionism as it encapsulates the 
ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ﾐ;ヴヴﾗ┘ IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐデ┞が which reflects the Thatcherite view of the 
state that came to dominate Conservative thinking in the 1980s (Hayton, 2012, p. 62).  
 
UKIPげゲ unionism is also illustrated by the fact that it competes electorally across all four nations of 
the UK, and the party held manifesto launches ｷﾐ W;Iｴ ;デ デｴW ヲヰヱヵ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ WﾉWIデｷﾗﾐく UKIPげゲ ﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデﾗ 
for Northern Ireland included a clear declaration of the p;ヴデ┞げゲ ┌ﾐｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏが ゲデ;デｷﾐｪ デｴ;デぎ  
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UKIP will work to return to the Northern Ireland Office representation in the form of a 
Secretary of State and Ministers who are reliable Unionists. UKIP will demand that the N.I.O. 
act and perform its duties in a manner whｷIｴ SWaWﾐSゲ ;ﾐS ┌ヮｴﾗﾉSゲ NﾗヴデｴWヴﾐ IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ 
within the UK. UKIP ┘ｷﾉﾉ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ; NくIくOく ヮヴWゲWﾐIWが けゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデｷ┗Wげ ﾐﾗデ ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉ ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗W ﾗﾐ 
NﾗヴデｴWヴﾐ IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐく (UKIP, 2015c, p. 11). 
 
Tｴｷゲ ;ヴデｷIﾉW ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ UKIPげゲ unionism should be understood as an expression of Anglo-Britishness. 
Iﾐ CｴヴｷゲデﾗヮｴWヴ Bヴ┞;ﾐデげゲ デWヴﾏゲが けAﾐｪﾉﾗ-British England is the England that was at the heart of the 
making of Great Britain and the Empire, the one in which the differences between England and 
Britain disaヮヮW;ヴ ﾗヴ ;ヴW ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉｷゲWSげ ふBヴ┞;ﾐデが ヲヰヰΒが ヮく ヶΑΒぶく CﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞ a politicised Englishness 
can find expression through the defence of UK sovereignty (Wellings, 2011). So while reluctant to 
end its commitment to the unitary British state, UKIP has appeared increasingly keen to tap into and 
articulate a sense of English grievance. It is, ;ゲ Jﾗｴﾐ H;ヴヴｷゲ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ｴ;ゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗WSぎ けデｴW IﾗﾐS┌ｷデ aﾗヴ ; 
specifically English political revolt, and full of people who highlight the notion of England as an angry, 
introverted pﾉ;IWげ. Concerns over immigration and multiculturalism are central to this, and the 
significant rise of the former, particularly since the expansion of the European Union in 2004, has 
enabled UKIP to link these concerns with their central policy of withdrawal from the EU.  
 
Public disquiet about the issue led David Cameron to pledge during the 2010 election campaign that 
if elected he would reduce annual net migration to under 100,000. The Coalition government failed 
to meet this target quite spectacularly, with net migration in 2014 calculated at 318,000, marginally 
below the all-time record set in 2005 (ONS, 2015). While UKIP supporters are typically concerned 
;Hﾗ┌デ ｷﾏﾏｷｪヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ┘;ﾐデ デﾗ ゲWW ｷデ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデﾉ┞ I┌デが ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ H┞ LﾗヴS AゲｴIヴﾗaデ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS デｴ;デ けin 
デｴW ﾏｷ┝ ﾗa デｴｷﾐｪゲ デｴ;デ ;デデヴ;Iデ ┗ﾗデWヴゲ デﾗ UKIPが ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ;ヴW ゲWIﾗﾐS;ヴ┞げく HW aﾗ┌ﾐS デｴ;デ ┘ｴｷﾉW けthose who 
;ヴW ;デデヴ;IデWS デﾗ UKIP ;ヴW ﾏﾗヴW ヮヴWﾗII┌ヮｷWS デｴ;ﾐ ﾏﾗゲデ ┘ｷデｴ ｷﾏﾏｷｪヴ;デｷﾗﾐげ デｴｷゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ ┘;ゲ 
WﾏHﾉWﾏ;デｷI ﾗa ; SWWヮWヴ けSｷゲゲ;デｷゲa;Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ┘;┞ デｴW┞ ゲWW デｴｷﾐｪゲ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ ｷﾐ 
cultural terms (Ashcroft, 2012, p. 5). In one widely reported intervention for example, Nigel Farage 
complained that catching the train out of London to his home in Kent, it was not until it reached the 
outer suburbゲ デｴ;デ けI Iﾗ┌ﾉS ｴW;ヴ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ HWｷﾐｪ ;┌SｷHﾉ┞ ゲヮﾗﾆWﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW I;ヴヴｷ;ｪWげく Iﾐ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ゲヮWWIｴ ｴW 
Iﾉ;ｷﾏWS デｴ;デ けin scores of our cities and market towns, this country in a short space of time has 
frankly become unrecognisableぐ Whether it is the impact on local schools and hospitals, whether it 
is the fact in many parts of England you donろデ ｴW;ヴ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ ゲヮﾗﾆWﾐ ;ﾐ┞ ﾏﾗヴWげく Iﾏﾏｷｪヴ;デｷﾗﾐが ｴW ゲ;ｷSが 
┘;ゲ ﾉW;Sｷﾐｪ デﾗ ┘ｴﾗﾉW ;ヴW;ゲ HWｷﾐｪ けデ;ﾆWﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴげ ┘ｷデｴ けordinary folkげ ヮ;┞ｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
price (quoted in Hope, 2014). As such UKIP can be seen to be successfully tapping into a vein of 
nostalgic cultural nationalism which is then refracted through issues such as immigration and 
European integration. Iﾐ デｴｷゲ ゲWﾐゲWが デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ;ﾐデｷ-immigration and Eurosceptic positioning and its 
Englishness can be understood as two sides of the same populist radical right appeal (Mudde, 2007). 
UKIP can and should be understood as falling within the European populist radical right (Bale, 2012) 
but as discussed here the unionist framework of the UK shapes how this appeal manifests itself in a 
distinctive way. 
 
This article seeks to explore how UKIP has attempted to balance its central objective of withdrawal 
from the European Union, and its commitment to the union, with the emergence of a more Anglo-
centric sense of identity in England and its growing intrusion into British politics. It does this firstly by 
IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴW Iｴ;ﾐｪｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ IﾗﾐデW┝デ ゲｷﾐIW デｴW ;S┗Wﾐデ ﾗa 
devolution under New Labour. Secondly, it considers the extent to which UKIP has become a vehicle 
for the mobilisation of a populist form of English national identity in terms of support for the party 
and the attitudes of its membership. It argues that UKIP has spoken directly to English grievances 
around the devolution settlement, particularly the Barnett formula and English votes for English laws 
(EvfEl), but largely through the language of Anglo-Britishness.  
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Constitutional questions  
 
The sense that the UK is stronger together, ;ﾐS デｴWヴWaﾗヴW HWデデWヴ ヮﾉ;IWS デﾗ デｴヴｷ┗W ;ゲ ;ﾐ けｷゲﾉ;ﾐS ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ 
ﾗ┌デゲｷSW デｴW EU ｴ;ゲ ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐWS ; ヮWヴゲｷゲデWﾐデ aW;デ┌ヴW ﾗa UKIPげゲ デｴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ W┗Wﾐ ;ゲ デｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴW Bヴｷデｷゲｴ 
constitutional settlement has been significantly altered by devolution. Indeed, while the 
Conservative Party moved relatively quickly to accept devolution to Scotland and Wales after 
fighting against it during the 1997 election and subsequent referendums, UKIP struggled to accept 
this new state of affairs. In a policy statement entitled Restoring Britishness published in 2010, the 
party painted a picture of a nation and an identity under threat:  
 
Britain and Britishness are in trouble. They are being attacked and undermined, both 
externally and internally. They are threatened by the European Union (EU) and corporatist 
Americanised pressures from without, and betrayed by misguided politically correct 
ideology, extremist Islam and errant nationalism from within (UKIP, 2010a, p. 3).  
 
Sub-state nationalisms were also explicitly linked by UKIP to the EU:   
 
In addition, Britain faces a serious existential crisis, with Scottish, Welsh and Irish 
nationalisms on the rise. These nationalisms have been enchanted by Brussels that they will 
have more independence as a province of Europe than as a major constituent part of the 
United Kingdom. But this is bogus independence (UKIP, 2010a, p. 3). 
 
In policy terms, the document indicated that the executive powers would remain devolved to 
“Iﾗデﾉ;ﾐSが W;ﾉWゲ ;ﾐS NﾗヴデｴWヴﾐ IヴWﾉ;ﾐSが ;ﾐS デｴ;デ ;ﾐ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ W┝WI┌デｷ┗W け┘ﾗ┌ﾉS He created from British 
SWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデゲ デｴ;デ ;ヴW SW a;Iデﾗ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ Wﾐｪ;ｪWS ｷﾐ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ ;aa;ｷヴゲが ｴW;SWS H┞ ;ﾐ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ Fｷヴゲデ MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげ  
(UKIP, 2010a, 6ぶく C┌ヴｷﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが デｴW ヮ;ヮWヴ ヮﾉWSｪWS デﾗ けヴWヮﾉ;IW ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ ﾗa デｴW “Iﾗデデｷゲｴが WWﾉゲｴ 
and Northern Ireland Assemblies wiデｴ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ WWゲデﾏｷﾐゲデWヴ MPゲげ (2010a, p. 6) who would meet in 
their respective nations monthly (with the English MPs having equivalent gatherings at Westminster) 
- a seemingly totally impractical form of devolved governance, given that these MPs, in addition to 
their duties as legislators in two assemblies, would also need to form the executives. As Alan Trench 
ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS ｷﾐ ; Hﾉﾗｪ ;デ デｴW デｷﾏWが デｴW ヮ┌HﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴｷゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ SﾗI┌ﾏWﾐデ HWデヴ;┞WS ; けSWWヮﾉ┞ Aﾐｪﾉﾗ-
IWﾐデヴｷI ┗ｷW┘ ﾗa BヴｷデｷゲｴﾐWゲゲげ ｷﾐ UKIPげゲ デｴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪく Aゲ ｴW ﾐﾗデWSぎ けTｴｷゲ ｷゲ ;ﾐ ;ヴIｴWデ┞ヮ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa ヮヴｷﾏﾗヴSｷ;ﾉ 
unionism, explicitly さuniculturalざ and based on the English language, accompanied by celebrations of 
デｴW Cﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ┘W;ﾉデｴが Bヴｷデｷゲｴ ;IｴｷW┗WﾏWﾐデゲ ｷﾐ ゲIｷWﾐIWが I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ﾗヴ WﾐｪｷﾐWWヴｷﾐｪげ ふTヴWﾐIｴが ヲヰヱヰぶく These 
policies did nonetheless form part of the 2010 UKIP manifesto, with the accompanying full policy 
statement on constitutional issues declaring that this approach would create an English Parliament 
けH┌デ ┘ｷデｴ ﾐﾗ W┝デヴ; H┌ｷﾉSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗヴ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ;ﾐゲげ ふUKIPが ヲヰ10b, p. Γぶく F┌ヴデｴWヴﾏﾗヴWが デｴｷゲ HﾗS┞ け┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ヴWゲデﾗヴW 
Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐS デﾗ ｷデゲ ヴｷｪｴデa┌ﾉ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾉﾗﾐｪゲｷSW デｴW UﾐｷデWS KｷﾐｪSﾗﾏげゲ ﾗデｴWヴ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌Wﾐデ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ;ﾐS 
ｴWﾉヮ ヴWﾏﾗ┗W ヴWゲWﾐデﾏWﾐデ ﾗa ┌ﾐa;ｷヴ デヴW;デﾏWﾐデげ (2010b, p. 9). In addition to this, the Barnett formula 
would be scrapped, all regional governance abolished, ;ﾐS Iﾗ┌ﾐデｷWゲ ヴWゲデﾗヴWS ;ゲ デｴW けヮヴｷﾏW ┌ﾐｷデ ﾗa 
ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ ふヲヰヱヰHが p. 15).  
 
UKIPげゲ thoughts on devolution and the English Question were fleshed out further in another policy 
proposal put forward the following year by デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ deputy leader, Paul Nuttall. Developed in 
conjunction with the Campaign for an English Parliament, this document, A Union for the Future, 
accepted the continuation of the existing devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
but backed the creation of an English Parliament, as with the previous proposal, sitting in the House 
of Commons at Westminster. The House of Lords would also be reformed into an elected upper 
Iｴ;ﾏHWヴ けaﾗヴ デｴW ┘ｴﾗﾉW Uﾐｷﾗﾐげが ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW PヴｷﾏW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ and UK Cabinet would sit. This plan, the 
ヮ;ヮWヴ ;ヴｪ┌WSが ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS けWﾐS デｴW aヴｷIデｷﾗﾐ WﾐｪWﾐSWヴWS H┞ デｴW I┌ヴヴWﾐデ SW┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ヴ┞ ゲWデデﾉWﾏWﾐデげ ;ﾐS 
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デｴWヴWH┞ ゲ;┗W デｴW Uﾐｷﾗﾐく A a┌ヴデｴWヴ HWﾐWaｷデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW けPヴW┗Wﾐデｷﾐｪ デｴW EU SｷゲﾏWﾏHWヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐS 
into nine euro-regions whilst ensuring the future existence of England as a country within the United 
KｷﾐｪSﾗﾏげ ふN┌デデ;ﾉﾉが ヲヰヱヱが p. 3).  
 
The 2015 manifesto was rather less detailed on the issue of constitutional reform. However, the 
theme of addressing English grievances remained, with the party promising to abolish the Barnett 
formula and introduce English votes for English laws (UKIP, 2015). In early-2015 the party accused 
the Conservatives of a climb-down over the latter issue, suggesting that the plans advanced by 
William Hague to give English MPs a veto over English-only matters were insufficient and unclear, 
and would fail to genuinely deliver English votes for English laws (UKIP, 2015b). The 2015 manifesto 
;ﾉゲﾗ ヮﾉWSｪWS デﾗ IWﾉWHヴ;デW BヴｷデｷゲｴﾐWゲゲが けデ;ﾆW ヮヴｷSW ｷﾐ ﾗ┌ヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ ;ｪ;ｷﾐげ ;ﾐS けヮヴﾗﾏﾗデW ; ┌ﾐｷa┞ｷﾐｪ 
Bヴｷデｷゲｴ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWげ ふヲヰヱヵHが p. ヶヱぶく TｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞ ヮﾉWSｪWS デﾗ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデW デｴW Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW H┞ WﾐSｷﾐｪ けデｴW ┌ゲW 
of multi-ﾉｷﾐｪ┌;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;デデｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ SﾗI┌ﾏWﾐデゲげき ﾏ;ﾆW “デ GWﾗヴｪWげゲ D;┞ ;ﾐS “デ D;┗ｷSげゲ D;┞ H;ﾐﾆ 
holidays in England and Wales resヮWIデｷ┗Wﾉ┞き ;ﾐS ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWS ; けIｴヴﾗﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa Bヴｷデｷゲｴ 
history and achievements in the National Curriculum, which should place due emphasis on the 
┌ﾐｷケ┌W ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐ ｴ;ゲ ｴ;S ｷﾐ ゲｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ ┘ﾗヴﾉSげ ふヲヰヱヵHが p. 61).  
 
UKIPげゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デo the constitutional reform agenda, particularly in relation to devolution, has been 
to reassert a form of Anglo-Britishness, whilst also seeking to capitalise on resentment in England 
and supporting the celebration of English national identity, for examplW デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW “デ GWﾗヴｪWげs Day 
bank holiday policy (Mycock and Hayton, 2014). This Anglo-Britishness can accommodate 
recognition of English national identity rather more easily than that of the other nations of the UK. 
Following a bad-tempered protest he encountered in Edinburgh in May 2013, the UKIP leader, Nigel 
F;ヴ;ｪW ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS デｴ;デ WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa “Iﾗデデｷゲｴ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ┘WヴW け;ﾆｷﾐ デﾗ a;ゲIｷゲﾏげ ;ﾐS けSWWヮﾉ┞ ヴ;Iｷゲデが 
with a total hatreS ﾗa デｴW Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴげ ふBBC NW┘ゲが ヲヰヱンぶく D┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ヲヰヱヴ “Iﾗデデｷゲｴ ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW 
referendum campaign he used similar language in an article in the Daily Telegraph, asserting that 
けデｴW “NP ｷゲ デｴW ┗ﾗｷIW ﾗa ;ﾐデｷ-EﾐｪﾉｷゲｴﾐWゲゲげく Fﾗヴ F;ヴ;ｪWが デｴW ヴWaWヴWﾐS┌ﾏ ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗデ ;Hﾗ┌デ independence 
(as an independent Scotland would be subjugated to Brussels in any caseぶ H┌デ ┘;ゲ け;Hﾗ┌デ ゲWIWゲゲｷﾗﾐ 
aヴﾗﾏ Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSげ ┘ｴｷﾉW けMヴ C;ﾏWヴﾗﾐ WヮｷデﾗﾏｷゲWゲ ;ﾉﾉ デｴ;デ デｴW “Iﾗデデｷゲｴ ヮWﾗヮﾉW ┗ｷゲIWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾉﾗ;デｴW ;Hﾗ┌デ 
Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSげ ふF;ヴ;ｪWが ヲヰヱヴぶく So although UKIP remained in favour of the union, its attitude towards 
Scottish nationalism was uncompromising, leaving little room for any political expression of Scottish 
identity within its vision of the UK. Secessionist Scottish nationalism, in defining itself against the 
United Kingdom and Britishness, is, for UKIP, also defined against English national identity.  
 
The English Party?  
 
As discussed above, while UKIP has remained a unionist party, there is also evidence that the party 
has sought to exploit the politics of English resentment in relation to constitutional questions. This 
ｴ;ゲ ﾉｷﾐﾆWS デﾗ UKIPげゲ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉｷゲデ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴW WWゲデﾏｷﾐゲデWヴ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴﾏWﾐデ, as well as 
to its Euroscepticism. This section therefore considers the extent to which UKIP has become the 
vehicle for, and representative of, English nationalism に thereby inverting Arthur A┌ｪｴW┞げゲ 
characterisation of Englishness, as a movement rather than just a mood (Aughey, 2010). 
 
Ben Wellings (2011) has previously argued that Euroscepticism has been a key source of English 
nationalism, and data presented by Wyn Jones et al. (2013, p. 22) indicates that けE┌ヴﾗゲIWヮデｷIｷゲﾏ ｷゲ 
concentrated most heavily among those with a more English sense of nation;ﾉ ｷSWﾐデｷデ┞げく Their data 
showed that amongst those (in England) who identify on the Moreno scale as exclusively English, not 
British, almost two-デｴｷヴSゲ ふヶヴ ヮWヴ IWﾐデぶ ヴWｪ;ヴSWS デｴW UKげゲ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲｴｷヮ ﾗa デｴW EU ;ゲ ; H;S デｴｷﾐｪく Tｴｷゲ 
compared to 43 per cent amongst the population as a whole, and just 28 per cent of those who 
ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS ;ゲ けBヴｷデｷゲｴ ﾐﾗデ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴげく Cﾗﾐ┗WヴゲWﾉ┞ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴｷゲ ﾉ;デデWヴ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮが ヴヵ ヮWヴ IWﾐデ ヴWｪ;ヴSWS EU 
membership as a good thing for Britain, compared to just 14 per cent of those who identified as 
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けEﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ ﾐﾗデ Bヴｷデｷゲｴげ ふW┞ﾐ JﾗﾐWゲ et al., 2013, p. 19). Attitudes towards the EU were also mapped on 
to views about how England should be governed. Respondents who regarded UK membership of the 
EU as a good thing were by far the most likely to be happy with the status quo, with 40 per cent of 
them favouring this, with a further 29 per cent favouring EvfEl. Amongst those seeing EU 
membership as a bad thing however, just 14 per cent wanted to see current arrangements for 
English law-making continued, with 38 per cent favouring EvfEl, 22 per cent backing the creation of 
an English Parliament, and 20 per cent favouring English independence (Wyn Jones et al., 2013, p. 
21). 
 









Source: Adapted from Table 4.5 in Wyn-Jones et al., 2013, p. 35.  
 
 




Very Bad 351 9.6 
Bad 921 25.1 
Neither Good nor Bad 1194 32.6 
Good  447 12.2 
Very Good 382 10.4 
Don't Know 369 10.1 
Total 3664 100 
Source: BES Panel Data (second wave).  
 
The same report also found that けUﾆｷヮ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWヴゲ ;ヴW H┞ a;ヴ デｴW ﾏﾗゲデ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa ﾐ;tional 
ｷSWﾐデｷデ┞ ;ﾐS ;ヴW H┞ a;ヴ デｴW ﾏﾗゲデ ゲデヴﾗﾐｪﾉ┞ SｷゲIﾗﾐデWﾐデWS ┘ｷデｴ Hﾗデｴ ﾗa Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSげゲ ┌ﾐｷﾗﾐゲが a;┗ﾗ┌ヴｷﾐｪ 
ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iｴ;ﾐｪW Hﾗデｴ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ﾐS ｷﾐ デｴW UKげゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW EUげ ふヲヰヱンが p. 
32). More than half of UKIP supporters identified as either exclusively English (27 per cent) or more 
English than British (28 per cent), a larger proportion than amongst supporters of any other party 
(the next largest being Conservative supporters who registered 17 per cent and 26 per cent in the 
two categories respectively). A clear majority of UKIP supporters (59 per cent) expressed a 
preference for English rather than British being stated as the nationality on their passport, although 
82 per cent felt proud of the Union Jack (Wyn Jones et al., 2013, p. 33). In terms of the governance 
of England, UKIP supporters were more likely than those of other parties to be unhappy with the 
status quo, and more likely to support the creation of an English Parliament, although this was a far 
from universal opinion. Combining the levels of support for EvfEl and an English Parliament reveals 
that around three in four UKIP supporters want to see the West Lothian Question answered, even if 
they are unable to agree on how this should be done (Table 1).  
 
D;デ; aヴﾗﾏ デｴW Bヴｷデｷゲｴ EﾉWIデｷﾗﾐ “デ┌S┞ ヴW┗W;ﾉゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWヴゲ ;ヴW a;ヴ aヴﾗﾏ ﾗ┗Wヴ┘ｴWﾉﾏｷﾐｪﾉ┞ 
unionist. Asked whether it would be good or bad for England if Scotland were to become 
 All UKIP Con Lab 
Status quo 21 14 19 27 
EvfEL 36 42 46 28 
English Parliament 20 32 21 18 
Regional assemblies 8 6 5 10 
Dﾗﾐげデ ﾆﾐﾗ┘  16 6 10 16 
N 1,774 146 456 597 
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independent, 35 per cent thought that such an outcome would be detrimental to England. However, 
22 per cent thought it would be good for England if Scotland left the Union, with a further 33 per 
cent seeing it as neither good nor bad (Table 2).  
 
Seen in this context, attempts by UKIP to articulate and mobilise English nationalist sentiment seem 
unsurprising. In November 2014 for example, Nigel Farage seized upon the outcry over a tweet by 
Shadow Attorney General Emily Thornberヴ┞ デﾗ SWIﾉ;ヴW デｴ;デ けデｴW L;Hﾗ┌ヴ P;ヴデ┞ ｴ;デW デｴW IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa 
EﾐｪﾉｷゲｴﾐWゲゲぐ ;ﾐS I;ﾐげデ W┗Wﾐ ゲデ;ﾐS デｴW IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏげ ふケ┌ﾗデWS ｷﾐ BBC NW┘ゲが ヲヰヱヴぶく 
Thornberry was rapidly forced to resign following the controversy, which had a particular potency as 
the photoｪヴ;ヮｴ ゲｴW デ┘WWデWS ふﾗa デｴW “デ GWﾗヴｪWげゲ aﾉ;ｪ Sヴ;ヮWS aヴﾗﾏ a house with a white van parked 
ﾗﾐ デｴW Sヴｷ┗W┘;┞が ;ﾐS ゲｷﾏヮﾉ┞ ﾉ;HWﾉﾉWS けIﾏ;ｪW aヴﾗﾏ セ‘ﾗIｴWゲデWヴげぶ ┘;ゲ デ;ﾆWﾐ ┘ｴｷﾉW ゲｴW ┘;ゲ ﾗ┌デ 
canvassing in the Rochester and Strood by-election, which UKIP went on to win. Tournier-Sol (2015, 
p. 140) has argued that UKIP has deveﾉﾗヮWS ; けSｷゲデｷﾐIデｷ┗W ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wげ but that this draws upon three 
interrelated traditions: the British Eurosceptic tradition, the Conservative tradition, and the populist 
tradition. The populist tradition is an important WﾉWﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ UKIPげゲ EﾐｪﾉｷゲｴﾐWゲゲが based as the party is 
on an outsider and anti-political establishment status. Characterising the mainstream parties as anti-
English and part of a Westminster bubble cut off from reality is a persistent aW;デ┌ヴW ﾗa UKIPげゲ 
rhetoric. For example in labelling his ヮ;ヴデ┞ けデｴW PWﾗヮﾉWげゲ Aヴﾏ┞げが Nigel Farage was self-consciously 
┌ヴｪｷﾐｪ ┗ﾗデWヴゲ デﾗ けｴWﾉヮ ┌ゲ Hヴｷﾐｪ Sﾗ┘ﾐ デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴﾏWﾐデげ (Farage, 2015, p. 14).  
 
Table 3: Strength of national identity feeling amongst UKIP voters in different nations of the UK 
Strength of feeling 
British/English/ 
Scottish/Welsh 
UKIP voters in 
England 
UKIP voters in 
Scotland 
UKIP voters in 
Wales 
English British Scottish British Welsh British 
Not at all 2.1 3.4 13.1 6.0 14.7 2.7 
2 0.6 1.7 3.8 2.2 5.8 0.9 
3 1.7 2.6 4.2 4.9 6.1 1.7 
4 4.3 8.4 8.1 8.8 14.3 9.6 
5 6.2 11.3 7.7 13.3 8.2 11.0 
6 12.7 15.7 11.4 16.3 10.9 13.9 
Very strong 72.4 57.0 51.7 48.5 40.0 60.2 
Source: BES Panel Data (second wave).  
 
For Emma Vines (2016ぶ UKIPげゲ Ihampioning of English grievances with the constitutional settlement 
left by New Labour is linked to its anti-establishment discourse, and the sense that the English 
working-class has been neglected by mainstream political parties. Ford and Goodwin have similarly 
argued that white, blue-collar, less-WS┌I;デWS ﾏ;ﾉW ┗ﾗデWヴゲ aﾗヴﾏ デｴW IﾗヴW ﾗa UKIPげゲ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ H;ゲWが who 
デｴW┞ ｴ;┗W Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲWS ;ゲ デｴW けﾉWaデ HWｴｷﾐSげ ふヲヰヱヴが p. ヱΑΑぶく TｴW┞ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデ デｴ;デ けデｴWゲW ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ-class 
voters have begun to turn to a radical right party who reject the established political class and 
ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW デｴWﾏ ┘ｷデｴ ゲﾗﾏWﾗﾐW デﾗ Hﾉ;ﾏW aﾗヴ デｴWｷヴ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲげ ふヲヰヱヴが p. 176). The extent to which the 
social basis of support for UKIP is also linked to English national identity might, however, be 
questioned. At the 2015 general election, although UKIP attracted just 1.6 per cent of the vote in 
Scotland and 2.6 per cent in Northern Ireland, it was almost as popular in Wales (13.6 per cent) as it 
was in England, where it won 14.1 per cent (BBC News, 2015). However, BES data does reveal some 
difference in terms of strength of national identity feeling between UKIP voters in Wales and 
England. On an ordinal scale where respondents were asked to place themselves in terms of 
strength of national identity, 72.4 per cent of UKIP voters in England said they felt very strongly 
English (a larger proportion than for any other party, the next being BNP voters, at 66.8 per cent, 
then Conservative voters at 56.2 per cent). This was also a larger proportion than who described 
themselves as very strongly British (57 per cent). In Wales, by contrast, just 40 per cent of UKIP 
voters said they felt very strongly Welsh, behind both supporters of the nationalist party Plaid Cymru 
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(71.5 per cent of their supporters declared that they were very strong Welsh), and Labour voters (49 
per cent). A much larger proportion of UKIP supporters in Wales, 60.2 per cent, said they were very 
strongly British.  
 
This indicates that to the extent that there is a political space for a nationalist party in England it is 
occupied by UKIP, even though it does not primarily define itself in terms of sub-state national 
identity in the way that Plaid Cymru and the SNP do ふΒンくン ヮWヴ IWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴげゲ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWヴゲ 
declared that they felt very strongly Scottish). In Scotland and Wales a notable proportion of UKIP 
supporters reject Scottish and Welsh identity, whereas very few in England reject Englishness as part 
of their identity. This reinforces the idea discussed above that UKIP promulgates an Anglo-
Britishness which can be allied with Englishness relatively easily, but that struggles to accommodate 
the more overtly politicised Scottish or Welsh nationalisms. The geography of UKIP support in Wales, 
which is low in Welsh-speaking areas where Plaid Cymru is strong and higher in English speaking 
areas in the valleys and the north, ｷﾐSｷI;デWゲ デｴW ヴWゲﾗﾐ;ﾐIW ﾗa UKIPげゲ ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Aﾐｪﾉﾗ-British 
nationalism amongst some voters in Wales. This pattern of support was seen at the 2015 general 
election, and also in the 2014 European Parliament elections when UKIP won one of the four Welsh 
seats. Although in decline, Anglo-British unionism (linked to Ulster) is also still strongly felt by some 
voters in Scotland and in securing a Scottish seat in the European Parliament in 2014 UKIP may have 
tapped into this.  
 
Conclusion: narrating and politicising Englishness?  
 
Although the extent to which UKIP represents more of an electoral threat to the Conservatives or 
Labour is disputed (Evans and Mellon, 2015), as noted above its ideology is certainly on the right of 
the political spectrum and draws heavily from the Conservative tradition (Tournier-Sol, 2015). 
Wellings has previously argued that けEﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏ W┝ヮヴWゲゲWS ｷデゲWﾉa ;ゲ ; SWaWﾐIW ﾗa 
BヴｷデｷゲｴﾐWゲゲげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ デｴｷゲ けﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ ﾗa Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐS ;ﾐS Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐ ┘;ゲ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ W┗ｷSWﾐデ ｷﾐ IﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗W 
thinking, given the conservative adherence to the concept of Crown-in-Parliament sovereigﾐデ┞げ 
(2007, p. 395). Although Wellings was writing with reference to the Conservative Party, given the 
ゲｴ;ヴWS ｷﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉ ｴWヴｷデ;ｪW デｴW ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ｷゲ ┗;ﾉｷS aﾗヴ デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa UKIPげゲ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ;ﾉゲﾗく 
Kenny (2015, p. 35) has argued that the rise in support for UKIP is symptomatic of a nostalgic 
conservative Englishness Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲWS H┞ けrestorationist and Anglo-British forms of patriotic 
SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWげく AIIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ KWﾐﾐ┞が けIﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪﾉ┞が デｴW Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ ;ﾐS デｴWｷヴ ｴWヴｷデ;ｪW ┘WヴW aヴ;ﾏWS ;ゲ ;ﾐ 
endangered and embattled grouping, derided by a political establishment that was ideologically 
inclined to use the state on behalf of other ethnic and national minorities, rather than the 
ｷﾐSｷｪWﾐﾗ┌ゲ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴげ (2015, p. ヴンぶく Tｴｷゲ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ｴ;ゲ IﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞ ﾏWゲｴWS ┘Wﾉﾉ ┘ｷデｴ UKIPげゲ ヮopulist 
positioning, and its attempts to capitalise on the growing disenchantment with the mainstream 
political parties (Vines, 2016). ‘WゲW;ヴIｴ ｷﾐ ヲヰヱン aﾗ┌ﾐS デｴ;デ UKIP ┘WヴW ヴWｪ;ヴSWS ;ゲ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞ け┘ｴｷIｴ 
HWゲデ ゲデ;ﾐSゲ ┌ヮ aﾗヴ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ﾗa Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSげ ふWyn-Jones et al., 2013, p. 36), and with the growing 
strength of the SNP as a force in British, not just Scottish politics, UKIP has sought to present itself as 
a defender of English interests. On BBC Question Time in January 2015 for example, Deputy Leader 
P;┌ﾉ N┌デデ;ﾉﾉ SWIﾉ;ヴWS デｴ;デ ｴW ┘;ゲ けabsolutely sick to death of Salmond, Sturgeon, and the SNPげく HW 
went on:  
 
[W]ith them it is take, take, take, take, take, take, take. And we never get anything back. And 
what are they taking? They are taking your tax. People in Scotland get an extra £1,600 more 
デｴ;ﾐ ヮWﾗヮﾉW ｷﾐ Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSぐ Nothing is ever enough for them is it? Because youげ┗W ｪﾗデ “デ┌ヴｪWﾗﾐ 
now saying that Scottish MPs are going to vote on issues that only affect England. It is 
absolutely appalling. They have got devo-max now, and they have only got devo-max 
because of rogue poll in August which spooked the three Amigos に Cameron, Clegg and 
Miliband に who then scuttled up to Edinburgh and basically gave them everything they 
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wanted in a bribe not to go independent. The fact is that in Parliament English MPs should 
vote on English-only issues, and that should be the first step in effect to moving towards a 
fully-fledged English Parliament. (Nuttall, 2015). 
 
The scorn Nuttall directed towards the leaders of the main Westminster party leaders is typical of 
UKIPげゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ﾗa Iﾉ;ｷﾏｷﾐｪ デｴW┞ a;ｷﾉ デﾗ ゲデ;ﾐS ┌ヮ ｷﾐ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ﾗa けﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ aﾗﾉﾆげ (Farage, quoted in 
Hope, 2014). In recent years the party has achieved the greatest traction deploying this message in 
relation to immigration, but this has also been expressed in relation to the English question. While 
British politics has certainly witnessed the growth of Englishness in the past couple of decades に an 
けEnglish cultural sensibilityげ ;ゲ ﾗﾐW ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲデ ヮ┌デ ｷデ に that has not amounted to a full-blooded, 
politicised English nationalism (English, 2011). Nonetheless, as English national identity has 
strengthened, it has become an increasingly important dynamic in British politics. On the right in 
particular it has become the site of often fractious debate and a lens through which grievances over 
issues such as immigration and devolution are viewed and discussed. UKIPげゲ Aﾐｪﾉﾗ-centric 
BヴｷデｷゲｴﾐWゲゲ ｴ;ゲ Hﾗデｴ Wﾐ;HﾉWS ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐWS デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉﾗｷデ デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ﾗa ヴWゲWﾐデﾏWﾐデ 
in England. On the one hand, it has facilitated the channelling of English nationalist sentiment into 
the defence of UK sovereignty against the EU, and against secessionist nationalism (particularly the 
Scottish variant) which threatens the integrity of the UK. EvfEl and reform of the Barnett formula can 
also be easily accommodated within the Anglo-British view of England (Bryant, 2008, p. 678). 
However, although ;ﾐ W┝ヮﾉｷIｷデﾉ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷゲWS EﾐｪﾉｷゲｴﾐWゲゲ ゲﾗﾏWデｷﾏWゲ HヴW;ﾆゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｷﾐデﾗ UKIPげゲ 
rhetoric, the Anglo-British view precludes the wholehearted embrace of the more radical positions 
favour by some English nationalists such as English independence. Tensions over this remain within 
UKIP, illustrated by the fact that the party backed away from the English parliament proposal 
contained in the A Union for the Future policy document (which was ultimately withdrawn). As such 
UKIP today is a predominately English party articulating a language of Britishness, but in a narrowly 
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